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ABSTRACf 
This paper analyzes the relationship between the theory of  protection, fann income support 
and international trade distortion.  To parallel those of protection, a measure of distortion is derived 
which compares trade volumes under support policies with those which would occur under 
multilateral free trade.  Estimates are made of these measures for the European Community and the 
United States for a selection of commodities.  The relationship between measures of  protection and 
economic efficiency is also highlighted.  The conclusion is that present measures of protection 
such as the Producer Subsidy Equivalent are confusing as measures of either trade distortion or 
income support.  Some implications are drawn for the GAIT negotiations on agriculture and for 
the design of  domestic policies which minimize trade distortion. AGRICULTURAL POLICIES AND THE GATT: 
RECONCILING PROTECTION, SUPPORT AND DISTORTION 
I.  Introduction 
Multilateral trade negotiations on agriculture under the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT) have been stifled for over 40 years.  Previous glacial progress has been the result of 
countries insisting on the primacy of their domestic policy objectives, especially farm income 
support.  Nevertheless, the sector has been raised to the top of the agenda under the Uruguay 
round.  A major impetus for inclusion of agriculture as a priority sector is that, for two of the 
major participants - the European Community and the United States - farm policies in the 1980s 
have become increasingly expensive and more questionably effective.  Continued support with 
existing instruments depress world prices and thus become partially self-defeating.  Domestic 
agricultural policy reform has now become a significant national issue on both sides of the 
Atlantic, as weU as in other major trading countries (Japan and the Cairns Group). 
Multilateral agricultural policy "disarmament" under the GATT potentially allows countries 
to achieve domestic policy goals more effectively by offering the prospect of improving world 
market prices.  Because the GATT is the legal code governing international trade relationships, it 
does not have authority over domestic policies other than through their trade distorting effects. 
Therefore the achievable objective of the GATT negotiations is to minimize trade distortions, not 
necessarily to eliminate protection or domestic income  support.  Indeed, this objective of 
minimizing trade distortion has been central to the repeated declarations of intent from the GATT 
participants, most recently at the Economic Summit meeting in Houston. 
This objective, however, raises a serious issue for agricultural policy and trade analysts. 
Conventional analysis provides measures of (nominal or effective) protection and of agricultural 
support, traditionally through measures of producer surplus gain.  More recently, the Producer 
Subsidy Equivalent (PSE) has been (incorrectly) identified as  a measure of support.!  But the 
literature does not identify trade distortion specifically.  This paper addresses the question of 
whether these concepts are interchangeable and analyzes the relationships between them. 
The development of the PSE for the FAO by Josling (1973, 1975) refined and extended 
the more traditional measure - the nominal rate of protection (NRP).2  The OECD has applied and 2 
modified the PSE concept further under the Trade Mandate Study.  However, neither the PSE nor 
the NRP are more than partial measures of trade distortion.  Conventional measures of protection 
and support were originally designed to obtain a quantitative assessment of the domestic effects of 
government intervention.  The impetus of the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations has revealed a 
demand for a quantitative measure of the international effects of protection.  Much of the debate 
within the GATT negotiations has been concerned with the appropriate definition and possible use 
of an Aggregate Measure of Support (IA  TRC 1990a).  The PSE, either in 'pure' or modified form, 
has been suggested as an appropriate measure and has already been incorporated in the Canada-US 
Free Trade Agreement.  3  The need to separate protection from trade distortion has promoted the 
search for alternative aggregate measures for GATT purposes.  Several proposals include the Price 
Adjustment Gap (PAG) by Australia, the Trade Distortion Equivalent (IDE) by Canada, and the 
Support Measurement Unit (SMU) by the European Community.4 
There is an ongoing debate about whether an  aggregate measure is useful for the 
negotiating process, and if so, what an appropriate aggregate measure might be and what role it 
should play.  If  an aggregate measure has any role in GATT negotiations, it necessarily has to 
focus on trade distortion.  Thus the primary objective of this paper is to develop the analytical 
framework for the explicit measurement of distortion as opposed to protection and support.  In 
addition, since policy intervention is carried out for a variety of domestic reasons, with economic 
efficiency of secondary importance, such intervention will not be negotiated away, certainly not in 
a multilateral forum.  Thus, a secondary analytic objective is to seek those forms of  of intervention 
which minimize trade distortion while allowing for the maintenance of support. 
The structure of this paper is as follows.  Section II develops new measures of trade 
distortion to parallel those of protection.  The relationship of  each to traditional measures of  producer 
welfare (support) and efficiency is also highlighted.  Section III provides some estimates of the 
effects of current US and EC policies, and uses the measures derived by assessing the Production 
Entitlement Guarantee  (PEG)  as  an  example of an  alternative  policy  instrument that can 
simultaneously achieve domestic and GATT objectives.  Finally some conclusions are offered on the 
possibilities that such an analysis raises for the reform of domestic policies and on the implications 
and consequences for post-GATT negotiations. 3 
II.  Principles. 
Protection is usually defined on the basis of a difference between domestic and border 
prices.  So long as protection involves changes in the incentive prices facing producers and 
consumers from their free  trade levels, resulting trade volumes will inevitably be distorted 
compared with free trade volumes.  Thus protection normally implies distortion.  But the same 
level of. protection achieved through  different instruments can result in different levels of 
distortion.  Similarily, protection implies support to the domestic sector, usually at the expense of 
the consumer, taxpayer and trading partner.  Again, different methods of protection for the same 
level can provide different levels of support.  Concepts of protection and support involve 
considerations of price and cost differences from free trade conditions, where different definitions 
of the scope of  free trade lead to different measures of protection and support.  But trade distortion 
arises from differences in trade volumes compared to free trade, albeit related to price and cost 
differences.  Thus it is possible to measure distortion directly through comparisons of trade 
volumes under different market and policy conditions. 
Consider Figure 1,  which represents stylized versions of product subsidy (deficiency 
payment) and export subsidy (restitution) policies for a single commodity.  Ps is the domestic 
support price corresponding to  these  two  policies.  Pw  is  the  current world  price.  The 
conventional measure of protection is the nominal rate of protection (Corden) which, in this case, 
is defined as: 
NRP  =  (Ps-Pw)/Pw  (1) 
which is the same for both policy alternatives. 
Josling's original defmition of the PSE is now more usually known as the per cent PSE: 
per cent PSE  =  (Ps-Pw)/Ps  (2) 
Total PSE, equivalent to Producer Subsidy Value in Josling's (1973) contribution, is defined as: 
PSE  =  A+B+C  (3) 
in Figure 1.  The PSE thus measures the total nominal cost to consumers, taxpayers and the 4 
economy of the policy intervention.S Any nominal measure used in this paper refers to a single 
country, single commodity situation with no terms of  trade effects6. 
Support to the agricultural sector is conventionally measured as the producers' surplus gain 
(pSG) resulting from the policy, as above in nominal terms: 
NominalPSG  =  A+B  (4) 
We can now define nominal transfer efficiency (TE) as: 
Nominal TE  =  Nominal PSG/PSE  (5) 
Thus, PSEs do not define support to agriculture.  Conventional analysis defines the compensation 
required as the PSG.  Hence transfer efficiency converts the commonly used measure of support to 
the conventional economic measure.7 
Although the measures defined in equations (1)  - (5)  are  the  same for both policy 
alternatives, their trade distorting effects are not.  The distortion of world markets is a consequence 
of  variations in trade volumes from those which would obtain in the absence of  policy intervention. 
Thus, in Figure 1, the deficiency payment results in a smaller change in trade volume than the 
equivalent export subsidy, (holding either PSE or PSG constant), simply because the deficiency 
payment does not alter the demand side of the market directly8.  Thus the definition of a nominal 
rate of  distortion needs to be based on trade quantities and is here defined as: 
NRD=  (S-D) - (S'-D') 
{Abs[S* -D*] + Qa} 
(6) 
where  S,  D,  S'  and D' are  the  'policy  on'  and  'policy off supply  and demand quantities 
respectively, as shown in the figure, Qa is the autarkic quantity, and S* and D* are the supply and 
demand quantities which would occur under multilateral free-trade in all agricultural commodities. 
The rationale for this defmition of NRD is as follows.  The numerator represents the trade distortion 
(measured at the current world price).  This is compared to the "natural" or free-trade position (S* -
D* - the first term in the denominator) for that particular commodity and country, where the policy 
interventions in all agricultural commodity sectors and in all countries are eliminated9.  The natural 5 
trade position avoids biasing NRD against large traders, as would be the case if total world trade 
were used as the numeraire.  In addition, the autarkic quantity is included in the denominator as a 
measure of country size, which avoids biasing NRD against large countries.  This term also serves 
as a normalizing factor which avoids the explosion or vanishing of the measure as any of the trade 
volumes in the measure approach zero. 
Incorporating  natural  trade  volume  in  absolute  terms  (Le.,  ignoring  signs)  in  the 
denominator avoids problems arising from trade switching between policy regimes and also 
eliminates discrimination between importers and exporters in the measure of NRD.  Note that NRD 
can take either sign or be zero.  A positive (negative) NRD indicates that policy has increased 
(decreased) world trade volumes compared with 'policy-off trade, independent of whether the 
country is an importer or an exporter or whether a switch occurs in its trading status.  NRD is equal 
to zero (Le. no distortion) only when policy intervention does not change the trading position of the 
country. 
Associated with this definition of trade distortion is the concept of a trade  equivalent 
support price (P), which is defined as the price equivalent of the policy set producing current 
observed trade volumes.  That is, P is the support price which would produce currently observed 
trade volumes if the only support instrument were a uniform border tax/subsidy.  In this sense P -
Pw represents the "tariffied" version of the existing support and protection package.  Thus, in the 
export refund case, P is equal to Ps.  However, in the deficiency payment case, P will lie between 
the producer support price (Ps) and the current world price (Pw), its precise position depending on 
the relative domestic supply and demand elasticities.  Any mixture of intervention mechanisms, such 
as the combination of a price support with a production quota and a consumer subsidy, results in a 
particular traded quantity.  Given knowledge of the underlying domestic supply and demand 
parameters, there exists an excess supply schedule from which the price support equivalent (P) of 
this traded quantity can be determined.  It may be that P lies below Pw, in which case the net effect 
of the policy set is to tax rather than subsidize agricultural trade, which is typical of  many developing 
country and centrally planned economy policy sets. 
Thus, the NRD formally identifies deficiency payments as less distorting (Le. smaller) than 
export subsidies.  Similar analysis identifies import levies as equally distorting (given the same level 6 
of protection and supply and demand elasticities) as export subsidies.  Thus, distortion depends 
critically on the nature and mixture of  policy intervention.  There is no unique relationship between 
levels of  protection and distortion. 
So far, the analysis has ignored a number of issues.  Extension of these concepts from the 
partial, single commodity, single instrument case to the agricultural sector requires incorporation of 
cross-commodity and input effects, and of  complex mixtures of  intervention instruments observed in 
the real world.  This leads to the concept of effective rates of protection (ERPs).  The PSE, too, 
includes input and other support instruments, but without explicit use of  cross commodity and input 
demand parameters, or of the details of  the intervention mechanisms  10 (OECO, 1987).  In particular, 
the incidence of different intervention measures is determined through arbitrary rules (Josling, 
1975).  Hence the meaning of the per cent PSE as a measure of the effect of protection on product 
supply is unclear.  On the other hand, the calculation of ERPs involves explicit incorporation of 
cross commodity and input effects, as well as intervention in the processing sector, to determine 
their output price equivalents (Corden). 
In exactly similar fashion, effective rates of distortion can be defined to take explicit 
account of cross commodity, input and the terms of trade effect of the own country only.  Given S" 
and D" as the supply and demand quantities which would obtain under unilateral free trade, the 
effective rate of  distortion is: 
ERD  =  (S-D) - (S"-D") 
{Abs[S* -D*] + Qa} 
(7) 
Associated with the definition of S" and D", there is a unilateral free trade world price, P", as that 
world price which would obtain if this country alone eliminates all market intervention policies in 
agriculture.  Furthermore, for the two stylized policies represented in Figure 1,  P" lies between P 
and Pw.  As before, ERD can take either sign or equal zero.  In a single commodity case with no 
cross-commodity effects and for the two policies in Figure 1, NRD minus ERD (the rate of trade 
distortion due to domestic policies) would be positive.  As will be shown in the empirical results 
below, cross-commodity effects or specific policy measures (eg, supply controls) make it possible 
for NRD to be  less than ERD.  Again, no distinction is made between those policies which 7 
positively protect trade (expand exports or reduce imports) and those which provide negative 
protection (reduce exports or encourage imports).  Both are regarded as distorting. 
However, the critical factor to consider with reference to multilateral trade negotiations is the 
effect on world trade and prices of universal reductions in protection, that is in all commodities and 
countries.  In addition, the conventional of support relates existing market and policy conditions to 
those which would obtain under perfectly competitive markets, that is, in this case, multilateral free 
trade.  Therefore we require measures of protection and distortion support which compare the 
current situation with that which would occur under multilateral free trade.  Effective rates of 
protection and distortion do not make this comparison.  11  We therefore define an Adjusted Rate of 
Protection and an Adjusted Rate of Distortion which do account for world market changes 
following from multilateral reduction in protection. 
Consider Figure 2.  Again, we deal with two stylized policies, the deficiency payment and 
the export subsidy.  However, we also consider the effects of: (i) a policy which raises the price of 
an input (eg cereal feed for livestock); and (ii) all countries policies on world prices.  Thus, 
elimination of all policies: (i) shifts the supply curve for this commodity from S 1 to S2;  and (ii) 
changes world price from Pw to P*.  In Figure 2, we show the world price increasing towards but 
not above domestic support prices.  It is not guaranteed that world prices will increase.12  However, 
it is also clearly possible that world prices increase above domestic support prices, especially in 
those countries with low, zero or negative levels of protection. 
Quantity supplied increases from S to S* under both policies, but elimination of the policies 
has opposite effects on the demand side, from D to D* in each part of  Figure 2.  Per cent PSEs and, 
normally, nominal rates of protection are unchanged, since they relate to current support and current 
world prices.  Extending the definition of  effective rates of  protection to include the consequences of 
multilateral, as opposed to unilateral, eliminations in protection, we define the adjusted rate of 
protection as: 
ARP  =  (Ps - P*)IP*  (8) 
which is unambiguously lower than the nominal rate defined in equation 1, provided world prices 
rise.  Notice that Ps is identical between a deficiency payment scheme and an export refund scheme. 8 
Producers' surplus gain is now shown as the shaded portion in each diagram, following 
Just, Hueth and Schmitz.  This is the textbook measure of producers' surplus gain from existing 
policies, and will tend to be smaller than the nominal PSG identified above, since the effects of 
world price changes will outweigh the effects of the supply curve shift in most cases.  Including the 
world market distortion effects of  all policies in all commodity sectors and countries can result in the 
adjusted PSG being substantially lower than the nominal PSG defined earlier.  This emphasizes that 
the PSE cannot be "the payment that would be required to compensate farmers". 
The Adjusted Rate of Distortion is defined as: 
ARD  =  (S-D) - (S*-D*) ,  (9) 
{Abs[S* -D*] + Qa} 
Figure 3 summarizes the relationships between the three measures of trade distortion and illustrates 
the possible signs and relative sizes of  ARD to NRD and ERD. 
In this Figure the excess supply representations of four typical cases are shown:  (a)  a 
positively protected importer/exporter;  (b) a positively protected small size large exporter;  (c) a 
negatively protected importer; (d) a negatively protected exporter.  The excess supply curve is 
simply domestic supply less domestic demand unencumbered by policy.  All policy instruments are 
assumed to be represented on the domestic market, but these representations are not carried through 
to adjustment of the excess supply curve.  Rather they are summarized in the traded quantities and 
the associated trade equivalent support price, P.  As before, Pw is the current world price, pA is the 
unilateral free trade price, and p* is the multilateral free trade price. The following discussion deals 
with the single commodity case only to keep the presentation of the conceptual analysis tractable. 
The empirical analysis below deals with illustrative calculations for the multi-commodity case. 
In panel (a), P lies well above Pw and the country is currently a large exporter (S-D), and is 
a natural exporter, as defined by its trade position at P*, (S*-D*).  However, at observed market 
prices and at unilateral free trade prices this country would be an importer, S'-D' and SA-DA 
respectively.  NRD measures trade distortion in trade resulting from the difference between P and 
Pw, ERD measures distortion between P and pA, while ARD refers to distortion between P and P*. 
Thus the bases of the three measures of distortion are illustrated by arrows in Figure 3,  but the 
definitions compare the associated trade volumes.  Thus the arrows in the figure merely indicate the 9 
relative prices associated with the distortion measures  13 . 
NRD and ERD are always positive in Figure 3 and NRD is always greater than ERD.14  The 
difference between NRD and ERD shows the effect of  domestic policies on world trade and prices. 
The difference between ERD and ARD shows the effects of other countries policies on this 
country's trade.  These effects will be further elaborated in the next section, where estimates of the 
proportions of the PSE which are simply offsetting terms of trade effects (NRD-ERD) and the world 
price effects of  other countries policies (ERD-ARD) are presented. 
In panel (b), these relationships are repeated with an important exception.  Again, NRD-
ERD represents the effect of this country's policies on world trade and price.  However, p* is 
greater than P, resulting in a negative ARD.  The rationale is as follows.  Although this country has 
a positive rate of  protection (in the conventional sense), it has not been able to completely offset the 
effects of other countries policies, and hence is exporting a smaller quantity than would be the case 
under multilateral free trade.  Hence, its adjusted rate of  protection must be negative, and is here so 
defined. 
The relationship of P" with that of P and Pw depends on the method of support and the 
direction of protection.  The relationship between p* and the remaining prices depends on 
interactions between all countries policies and the underlying market parameters.  A priori, p* can 
be at any level.  For positive protection cases, P is greater than Pw while for negative protection P is 
less than Pw, as shown in panels (c) and (d), which are typical of developing countries. 
We can now summarize the effects of typical intervention mechanisms on trade distortion. 
First, agricultural policy sets in most countries are a complex mixture.  This section has outlined the 
principles by which their combined effects on traded quantities and therefore on world markets and 
prices can be analyzed and has presented methods of  measuring both the price and quantity effects of 
trade distortion.  Second, in so doing it has been noted that PSEs (and thus their derivatives) as a 
modified measure of protection, do not measure support or trade distortion, while traditional 
measures of protection (NRP and ERP) are incomplete.  Third, the analysis implies that instruments 
which both encourage production and discourage consumption, such as export subsidies and import 
taxes, are more distorting than those which affect only one side of the market, such as production 
subsidies.  Further, instruments which curtail production while maintaining high support prices, are 10 
less trade distorting than their unlimited counterparts (de Gorter and McClatchy), providing that 
these limits on production do not change trade by more than if  price supports were conditional on no 
production limits. 
Lastly in this section, the major elements of transfer efficiency can now be identified.  The 
definition of transfer efficiency (equation 5) related producers' surplus gain (PSG) to the total PSE. 
The discussion of  adjusted rates of distortion identifies two major leakages from the PSE in addition 
to the conventional net welfare costs.  These can be termed the "trade offset", which captures the 
extra cost incurred as a result of the terms of trade effect consequences of the domestic policy set, 
and the "policy offset" which captures the effects of  other countries policies on world prices.  Thus 
the PSE can now be broken down as follows: 
PSE  =  Trade Offset + Policy Offset + Resource Cost + Real PSG  (10) 
Thus the transfer efficiency of the domestic policy set will depend on the sizes of the offsets in 
addition to the conventional resource cost.  In particular, the policy offset can swamp the PSE and 
leave the transfer efficiency negative, in those cases where ARD is negative.  A zero PSE will 
automatically be associated with a zero trade offset in the single commodity case, but a positive or 
negative policy offset would, in this case, result in a negative or positive PSG, in which case 
transfer efficiency becomes undefmed according to equation (5)15 
Cross commodity effects complicate this analysis.  In a multi-commodity world, it is no 
longer the case that ARD is necessarily smaller than NRD.  Depending on the consequences of 
changes in prices for other commodities, and on the price relatives ruling under the unilateral free 
trade scenario, it is possible that S* - D* is greater than SA  - DA even though the price for this 
commodity has fallen.  It is also possible that multilateral free trade volumes are greater (exports 
greater or imports lower) than current volumes for some commodities, even though P > p* and P > 
Pw in all cases.  This is especially likely for feed grains, if grain prices fall (P to P*) by a smaller 
proportion than those for livestock products.  Under these circumstances, the feed cereal supply 
curve shifts to the right while the demand curve shifts to the left.  Even though cereal prices fall, 
trade may increase, in which case the sign of ARD will be negative, as already noted above. 16 11 
III.  Implications 
In this section, we present some estimates of these various measures, for the United States 
and the European Community for five commodities, to illustrate the principles outlined above. 
Clearly, complete analysis using these concepts requires explicit models not only of the countries in 
question but also of the rest of the world.  Any results will depend on the assumptions and 
parameter values of the models used.  As such they will always be subject to criticism.  The 
following results certainly suffer in this respect, but are sufficient to illustrate the concepts developed 
above. 
Multilateral and unilateral free trade prices are those produced by Roningen and Dixit, while 
the base PSEs for those policies analyzed are as calculated by the USDA (US) and the OECD (BC). 
The results are derived from partial models of each commodity sector, including cross commodity 
effects.  The features of  the models, data and its sources are briefly described in the Appendix. 
Table 1 shows estimates of rates of protection and distortion.  The PSE shows the same 
relative values between commodities as the NRP, but, as Peters notes, the values are noticeably 
different and the relationship is non-linear because the base of the PSE is current support price while 
that for the NRP is current world price.  The relationships between NRP, ERP and ARP, defined on 
the  basis of the difference between Ps and Pw, P" and P* respectively,  show  the expected 
relationships.  That is, the rates of protection fall as we move from current world prices through 
unilateral free trade prices to multilateral free trade prices.  Input and cross commodity effects on 
these prices are included in the estimates.  Notice that for beef in the United States and sugar in the 
European Community, ARP is negative because the multilateral free trade price (P*) is above 
domestic support price (Ps).  In the case of milk on both sides of the Atlantic, the effect of world 
price increases on measures of protection is especially marked.  Nevertheless, for both countries, 
rates of protection are broadly comparable, albeit the ranking of commodities changes, especially 
between PSE and ARP measures of protection. 
The relationships between NRD, ERD and ARD described in the previous section are also 
illustrated in these estimates in Table 1.  There are several cases where the rates of distortion are 
negative; this reflects the fact that the trade position moves such that the world price increases under 
the particular free trade scenario for these commodities.  These estimates are negative because of the 12 
large cross price effects or because of the supply control measures currently in place that affect the 
change in trade in a unique manner upon their removal. 
Comparison between ARD and ARP shows the importance of taking specific policy 
instruments into account.  Rates of protection employ the support price in comparison with the 
relevant reference price.  Rates of  distortion compare traded quantities, which in turn reflect changes 
in trade equivalent prices, incorporating the detailed mechanics of the support mechanisms.  This is 
especially important in United States wheat and corn, with the mixture of set-aside, deficiency 
payments, diversion payments and loan rates, and in EC milk and sugar, where production quotas 
and co-responsibility levies limit the effect of the nominal support price.  In all these cases, reliance 
on any of the measures of protection give a false impression of the relative distortion arising from 
the policies. 
The contrast between cereals and dairy in both countries shows the differences between 
rates of protection and rates of distortion.  While the PSEs for these two commodities is very 
similar, the adjusted rates of protection show that protection on dairy is twice that of corn in the 
United States and half that of barley in the European Community.  Adjusted rates of distortion tell a 
quite different story, and one which appears to conform to a priori expectations.  Relative distortion 
rates are different again, being in the opposite direction in the United States compared with the 
European Community, except for dairy which are almost identical for the two regions.  This 
emphasizes the importance of measuring distortion directly rather than attempting to infer it from 
rates of protection, however carefully measured, and also powerfully illustrates the potential for 
being misled by treating PSEs as if they measured world market distortion. 
Table 2  shows the proportional breakdown of PSEs into Trade Offset, Policy Offset, 
Resource Cost and Adjusted Producer Surplus Gain, the latter being an indicator of  how much better 
off producers of a given country are, with the current set of policies for all commodities in all 
countries, than they would be under multilateral free trade.  The relative importance of the trade and 
policy offsets is particularly notable, and demonstrates the potential gains to be made through 
multilateral reduction of agricultural distortion.  Many traditional economic welfare studies present 
only the deadweight loss triangles due to policy intervention (analogous to column 3 in Table 2) and 
argue that they are very small and insignificant (Schmitz).  The true inefficiency of current policy 13 
measures in transferring consumer and taxpayer dollars to the agricultural sector is better measured 
by the Adjusted PSG given in the final column of Table 2.  These figures indicate that the social 
costs of  policy intervention are very substantial. 
Finally in this section, we tum to the implications of this analysis for the twin principle 
targets of agriCUltural support policies - improvement of  farm returns, here measured by Producers' 
Surplus Gain compared with the multilateral free-trade position, and the burden of support borne by 
taxpayers.  Traditional economic analysis usually recommends the substitution of direct income 
payments for current support policies on the grounds of economic efficiency.  The efficiency gains 
result from the supposed minimization of distortion of domestic markets under direct income 
payments, which also results in minimum distortion of trade volumes and hence world price 
distortion.  Two major criticisms of this recommendation are commonly encountered by policy 
advisors: the potential tax cost of direct payments versus instruments which often place much of the 
burden on consumers;  the practical difficulties of  designing and delivering direct income payments 
in a manner which is acceptable through existing political processes to producers. 
Blandford, de Gorter, Gardner and Harvey  have  advanced the Producer Entitlement 
Guarantee (PEG) as a workable alternative to present support policies which incorporate most of the 
advantages of direct income payments while retaining at least a notional link to production, in 
deference to the political necessity for farmer acceptability.  Under their proposal, all support would 
be paid through Treasury support or deficiency payments on a pre-set limited quantity of  production 
per farm.  For each country, the total quantity which could be supported would also be limited at a 
pre-set, fixed quantity, defined to be no greater than that quantity (the PEG) which would be 
produced under multilateral free-trade.  All other forms of market intervention would be eliminated 
under this proposal.  Under these conditions, conventional analysis maintains that the limited 
quantity receiving support payments would not affect the incentive prices facing either producers or 
consumers, which would be the free market world price, and hence would be non-distorting.
17  The 
estimates above allow the implications of such a policy alternative to be examined, both in terms of 
the potential cost to the Treasury and through a comparison of present levels of production with 
those which would obtain under multilateral free  trade - the PEG as  a percentage of current 
production.  Table 3 shows these results. 14 
In the flrst column, the estimated PSG is expressed as a proportion of current taxpayers 
expenditure on existing policy instruments, and thus representing the fraction of current tax 
spending which would be necessary under a PEG system to maintain existing levels of producer 
support (ignoring any differences between administration costs for the two policy sets).  Although 
tax spending would need to be increased for dairy in the US and for all flve illustrated commodities 
in the Ee, cereal and beef support in the US would be cheaper for the taxpayer than current support 
policies.  In addition, the PEG system is amenable to explicit targeting of support to the larger 
number of smaller producers (who produce a proportionately smaller fraction of total production), 
which could both be socially attractive and also reduce taxpayer commitments.  Furthermore, the 
PSG itself is an imperfect measure of the compensation necessary for farmers because producers' 
surplus includes policy-induced rents to all owners of factors in less than perfectly elastic supply18. 
Thus, if  farm income is the ultimate target of support, the cost is further reduced. 
The second column in Table 3 shows the production levels under multilateral free trade as a 
proportion of current production.  With the exception of dairy and sugar in the US, a substantial 
fraction of current production levels could be supported under a PEG scheme without distorting 
world markets.  With the exception of sugar, Ee production levels under the PEG scheme receiving 
support payments would have to be some flfteen percent below current production, for these flve 
commodities, in order to be non-distorting.  Given the reduction in production associated with the 
introduction of  milk quotas in the Ee, this need not raise insurmountable objections by the Ee farm 
sector nor would the associated PEG result in excessive tax costs compared to current expenditures. 
IV  Conclusions 
The purpose of this paper has been to demonstrate the theoretical principles according to 
which it is possible to separate agricultural support from agriCUltural trade distortion and, in so 
doing, clarify the meaning of  protection.  The need for such clariflcation is generated by the current 
GATT negotiations which have as their primary objective the reduction (elimination) of trade 
distortion in the face of  domestic pressures which (on the basis of history) require continued support 
of the agricultural sector.  It has been demonstrated that it is possible to separate these different 
concepts in the face of complex mixtures of farm policy instruments, and also possible to devise 
practical and acceptable methods of delivering support while minimizing trade distortion. 15 
There are obvious advantages to the development of and agreement to some aggregate 
measure of protection in the GAIT negotiations on agriculture (Tangermann, Josling and Pearson, 
1987a,b).  There is also a superficial attraction for using some modification of the PSE as such an 
aggregate measure, largely stemming from the fact that these data have now been prepared for the 
major (industrial) participants in the negotiations by an independent and multilateral agency (the 
OEeD).  This attraction leads to the search for simple rules to establish the appropriate modifications 
to these multilaterally accepted (if not agreed) measures for GAIT purposes.  The major argument of 
this paper, however, is that such simple modifications are bound to be grossly inadequate as 
measures of trade distortion. 
This paper has demonstrated that, in principle, there is no necessary direct relationship 
between the level of protection and either the level of trade distortion or income support to farmers. 
In addition, our framework of analysis shows that the true inefficiency costs of intervention can be 
much higher than the traditional deadweight loss triangle.  Furthermore, it is shown that policy 
offsets can easily reduce any implied gains in the trade offset for countries trying to exert their 
market power on world markets.  Thus there are substantial gains to be made through multilateral 
reduction in government intervention in agricultural markets. 
The measure of trade distortion, the principal contribution of this paper, illustrates the 
vagaries of  relying on an aggregate measure such as the PSE or its derivatives.  These arguments do 
not deny the utility of  employing aggregate measures as monitoring devices for progress during the 
implementation phase, although such use still requires considerable interpretation and judgement as 
to the progress indicated19.  But the principles of trade distortion developed in this paper can help 
the international community in their debate as to what proposed aggregate measure is best and in 
what role it might play in future negotiations.  This analysis provides a basis for the GAIT 
negotiations to condition the choice of aggregate measure of protection commitments, and help keep 
expectations about the results of  their reduction more realistic. 16 
Figure 1  Stylized Representation of Different Support Instruments 
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Figure 2  Stylized  Representation  of Different  Support Instruments 
[Multi-Commodity, Large Country Case] 
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Table  1.  Rates of Protection and Distortion: 
Illustrative Results  for  the US  and EC  (1986). 
Commodity  RatkS Qf Prore~tiQn  Rares of  DiS1QIliQn 
PSE  NRP  ERP  ARP  NRD  ERD  ARD 
US 
Beef  8.3  9.0  4.8  -8.9  11.4  7.9  -8.4 
Com  42.6  74.3  55.1  34.7  -5.2  -11.6  -16.8 
Dairy  71.9  255.4  187.2  105.4  74.9  59  35.4 
Sugar  55.1  122.9  81.5  46.0  31.7  25.6  19.4 
Wheat  49.2  96.7  77.8  43.9  1.7  -1.4  -11.1 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
EC 
Beef  47.7  91.2  71.0  59.7  78.5  63.9  55.2 
Barley  63.5  173.9  158.6  124.6  32.6  37.0  32.4 
Dairy  72.8  267.8  171.5  74.3  61.6  48.0  35.4 
Sugar  41.7  71.41  44.5  -34.51  22.2  11.9  -2.5 
Wheat  57.6  135.8  98.1  72.5  25.3  16.4  10.3 
Source: calculated. 20 
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1.  Josling (1973,1975,1980,1981), Tangennann, Josling and Pearson (1987a,b) and the 
OECD (p. 25) defme the PSE as "the payment that would be required to compensate fanners for 
the loss of  income resulting from the removal of a given policy measure". 
2.  An earlier study by de Gorter and McClatchy argues that the PSE is a modified rate of 
protection measure.  More recently, however, Peters provides a densely argued analysis not only 
on the similarities but also on the differences between rates of  protection and PSEs. 
3.  Other institutions using the PSE measure include the United States Department of 
Agriculture (1990) and the GATT mid-tenn review.  It should be pointed out that there are many 
empirical studies that measure rates of protection in agriculture on both sides of the Atlantic, even 
before the PSEs became popular in the 1980's.  For example, see Strak and Harling and 
Thompson. 
4.  Other proposals include the "Effective Rate of Assistance" (ERA) by Australia and the 
"Producer Incentive Equivalent" (PIE) by Rausser and Wright.  The majority of comprehensive 
proposals by member countries of the GATT have also alluded to the use of an aggregate measure 
of  protection (see the IATRC 1990a for details). 
5.  We use the term nominal in recognition of the fact that it is the free trade equilibrium price, 
rather than the current observed price, against which the consumer and economic costs of the 
policy should properly be measured. 
6.  The tenns of trade effect can be and are sometimes included in a NRP. (Corden, p. 21). 
However, tenns of trade effects are excluded from most empirical measures of NRPs and are also 
excluded from its defmition here. 
7.  Note that this a different definition than the one used by Gardner 1983, who defines 
transfer efficiency as  the economic or welfare cost of transfers to producers.  This welfare 
efficiency of  redistribution relates to the deadweight cost of  policy, and has been defined (Wallace, 
Josling, 1969, Gardner,  1983) as  the Harberger welfare triangle costs as a proportion of the 
producers' surplus gain.  These authors also distinguish between the  average and marginal 
efficiencies of  policies.  Here we are concerned with the average measures. 
8.  The fact that export subsidies (border protection) are more distorting than production 23 
subsidies (deficiency payments) is already recognized in the GAIT negotiations.  This paper 
formalizes the recognition. 
9.  Strictly speaking, such a concept should embrace the full general equilibrium specification 
of the multilateral free trade position, yielding what might be termed 'general' rates of protection 
and distortion.  However, for the purposes of the argument, we here restrict attention to the case of 
multilateral agricultural or sectoral free trade. 
10.  DECO explicitly adjust livestock PSEs for the protection of associated cereals sectors. 
11.  Corresponding to the effective rate of distortion are measures of effective rates of 
protection and effective producer surplus gains, definitions of which are not formally presented 
here but for which empirical estimates are given in the following section. 
12.  Roningen and Dixit and DECO, for example, show that world prices increase in most, 
though not all cases under agricultural multilateral free trade. 
13.  It would be possible to redefine measures of protection using the trade-equivalent support 
price, rather than actual support prices.  The resulting measures of protection would then be the 
price equivalent versions of the measures of trade distortion developed in this paper.  However, 
since distortion relates directly to differences in trade volumes, it is logical to define distortion in 
volume terms, as is done here. 
14.  This need not always be the case.  Two cases result in negative rates of  distortion (one of 
which accounts for ARD being negative in panel (b»: an exporter which becomes a larger exporter, 
and an importer which becomes either a smaller importer or an exporter, following introduction of 
free trade. 
15.  If  one country imposes a policy that improves its terms of trade and no other country 
retaliates, then the trade offset becomes negative.  For a given PSE, therefore, there is an increase 
in the real PSG.  However, other countries rarely allow such to happen, often resulting in positive 
policy offsets that swamp this negative trade offset.  This deleterious welfare effect is overlooked 
by those who advocate that governments should exert market power in world markets (eg, 
Schmitz, McCalla, Mitchel and Carter). 
16.  This is analogous to changes in sign of rates of protection as we move from nominal to 
effective measures. 24 
17.  The PEG proposal ignores the possible effects of such guaranteed payments on the risk of 
farm production and hence their possible effects on the position of the supply curve throughout its 
length.  This can be justified on the grounds that some form of stabilization of  returns is generally 
regarded as an improvement in economic efficiency in any event, and also on the grounds that 
progress towards minimizing distortion within the constraints of existing political processes is a 
good thing.  In addition, the existence of current policies has, by the same token, already shifted 
supply curves.  More limited support than current levels can hardly do other than shift existing 
curves to the left, if  at all. 
18.  That is, rents earned by farmers through their own labor, management and risk-taking 
represent only a fraction of producers' surplus gain.  For a good discussion on how the benefits of 
commodity policy is distributed to land rents and non-farm input suppliers, see chapter 4 in 
Gardner (1987). 
19.  The PSE and nominal rates of protection measures (as well as some other possible 
contenders for an aggregate negotiating measure such as the Price Adjustment Gap) have an 
undoubted advantage in that they rely solely on observed data for their calculation.  However, it is 
precisely this feature which prevents them measuring trade distortion except by accident. 25 
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Data Appendix 
Constant elasticity supply and demand functions are specified for each commodity.  These 
models were closed using change in inventory and trade data.  All quantity and observed price data 
for the United States were obtained from various issues of the USDA's (ERS) Situation and 
Outlook Reports for Livestock and Meat, Feed, Dairy, Sugar and Sweetners, and Wheat.  For the 
European Community, all quantity and observed price data were obtained from the DECO 
estimates of the Community'S PSEs (OECD: PSE and CSE Tables 1979-1987  DAN2001, April, 
1989.) 
The elasticity estimates used in these models are reported in Table A 1.  The world prices 
under the status quo and the unilateral and multilateral trade liberalization scenarios are given in 
Table A2.  Data relevant to policy interventions are summarized in Table A3. 
The policy coverage for the United States is as follows.  The 'voluntary' export restraint 
for beef in the United States is estimated to increase domestic prices by nine per cent (Australian 
Bureau of  Agricultural and Resource Economics).  The effects of target prices, acreage diversion, 
diversion and storage payments for participating farmers are evaluated for the com and wheat 
sectors.  The price discrimination scheme for milk is analyzed in the dairy sector along with 
government removals, import quotas and the blend price received by farmers (net of the special 
assessment in 1986).  The basic sugar price support scheme coupled with the import quota 
represents the policy coverage for the sugar sector. 
The policy coverage for the European Community follows the stylized representation of 
import levy/export refund policies with two important exceptions.  The impostion of  milk quotas in 
1984 has resulted in the 1986 support price/quantity observation lying above the underlying supply 
curve.  Currently unpublished research by Hubbard (Newcastle, UK) and Mahe (Rennes, France) 
both suggest that the quota value, representing the divergence of supply from the observed support 
price is about 18%.  Accordingly, the 'effective' supply price for milk is set 18% lower than the 
observed support price.  For sugar, the fact that most member states of the EC produced 'C' quota 
sugar, which is subject to a producer levy equivalent to the difference between the support price 
and the world price, is reflected by setting the producer 'incentive' price equal to the world price. 28 
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1.  Fluid milk only in the US.  The elasticities for manufacturing milk demand was -0.62 in the 
United States.  Since the OECD estimates of PSEs, on which the EC results are based, report 
milk as a total, the manufacturing and fluid milk elasticities were aggregated in the EC case. 
Source:  Roningen and Dixit. 29 
Table A2 
World Prices ($/tonne in 1986). 
Actual 1  Unilatera12  MllltiJatera12 
US  EC  US  EC  US  EC 
Beef  992.4  1571.0  1032.1  1756.4  1187.6  1880.0 
Corn*  59.0  60.7  66.3  64.3  76.3  74.0 
Dairy  75.2  75.2  93.1  101.8  130.0  130.0 
Sugar  161.2  186.5  198.0  221.2  246.1  284.8 
Wheat  80.6  80.5  89.1  95.9  110.2  110.1 
* Barley in the European Community. 
1.  Source is the DECD PSE and CSE Tables 1979-1987  DAA/2001,  April,1989. 
2.  Per cent change in world prices obtained from  Roningen  and Dixit, and from personal 
correspondence. 30 
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1.  Program yields for corn and wheat of 105 bu/acre and 35 bu/acre, respectively, were used to 
calculate deficiency payments in the US. 
2.  The Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Reource Economics estimate that the US domestic 
price increased approximately nine per cent due to the VER for beef. 
3.  Target prices for participant output only. 
4.  Producer average price net of assessment of $8.37 per tonne.  Fluid milk consumption price in 
the US is $299.7 per tonne and the manufacturing milk price of $260 per tonne. 
5.  Price reduced by eighteen per cent to account for the effect of  quotas on the milk supply curve. 
6.  Sugar price entered as the refererence price since "c" quota production occured in the majority of 
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